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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
)

COMMERCE FINANCIAL,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Respondent/Plaintiff
v.

CASE NO. 900050-CA

BADI M. MAHMOOD,
Appellant/Defendant
)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION:
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction of this
matter by virtue of Article VIII, Section I, Constitution of
Utah;

78-2a-3, U.C.A.;

Rule 3(a) Rules of the Utah Court of

Appeals.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW:
An action was filed in the Third District Court in and
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, wherein Commerce sought a
judgment against the appellant, Mr. Mahmood, for a deficiency
owing under a trust deed note.

The matter was tried to the

court without a jury, the honorable Raymond S. Uno presiding.
A Memorandum Decison was rendered by the court (R. 138) wherein
a judgment was granted in favor of the respondent.
A Motion for Clarification of the Memorandum Decision was
filed by the respondent (R.148), and under an Order Modifying
Memorandum Decision (R. 158) the court granted respondent's motion.
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Thereafter the appellant filed an Objection to Proposed
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment (R. 164) as
well as a Motion to Amend Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Judgment (R. 168), Respondent filed a reply to the appellant's
motion and objection (R. 170), and under a Minute Entry ruling
the court denied the appellant's motion and objection.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 178) and
Judgment (R. 185) were entered by the court, as was an Order (R.187)
denying appellant's objections to the proposed Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Judgment.

A Notice of Appeal was filed by

the appellant on November 22, 19 89 with the Third District Court.
(R. 189) .
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW:
(1) What is the correct value and amount of the credit
due to the appellant in accordance with the court's decision?
(2) How should that credit be applied towards the balance
deemed to be due at the time the property was sold?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE:
(A) NATURE OF THE CASE:
This is an appeal from a final "Judgment" and "Order"
by the Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County, Utah.
(B) COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, DISPOSITION AND RELEVANT FACTS:
1. It should be stated at the outset that no transcript of
the proceedings has been ordered since the issues revolve around
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the documents and pleadings in the record and the manner in which
the court has applied its own ruling.
2. On or about April 5, 1983, appellant entered into a loan
transaction with plaintiff whereby respondent provided to
Mahmood the principal sum of $48,662.56.

(R.179)

3. As a part of the loan transaction, Mahmood executed
certain documents in favor of the plaintiff including a Deed of
Trust.

The Deed of Trust was recorded in the Salt Lake County

Recorder's Office on May 13, 1983, which Deed of Trust was
related to real property located in Salt Lake City, Utah and
which Deed

of Trust conveyed to Commerce a second position in

and to said property. (R.179).
4. On or about January 3, 1984, the loan was renewed and
plaintiff Commerce provided to Mahmood the principal sum of
$48,958.02.

(R. 179)

5. On or about September 7, 1984, a notice of default
containing an election to sell was recorded by Valley Title
Company as trustee under a certain trust deed on the subject
property recorded in the office of the Salt Lake County Recorder,
which trust deed was subsequently assigned to Gate City Federal
Savings and Loan Association.

Gate City held a first lien position

by virtue of this trust deed. (R. 180)
6. On January 3, 1985, Valley Title Company conducted a
trustee's sale of the subject property, at which time Commerce
appeared and purchased the property and acquired title thereto
for the sum of $110,395.11 as the highest bidder at the sale, which
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sum was paid to Valley Title company for the use and benefit
of Gate City.

(R. 180)

7. After satisfaction of the underlying indebtedness of
$109,975.88 secured by the Gate City trust deed, there remainded a
balance of $419.23 which was applied to reduce the balance remaining
unpaid on Mahmood's promissory note.

(R. 180)

8. There was due and owing to Commerce on the date of said
trustee's sale, January 3, 19 85, on Mahmood's promissory note, the
sum of $57, 398.35 together with accruing interest.

(R. 180)

9. On or about March 8, 1985, Commerce sold the subject
property to Jay Craig Smith and Nancy Smith for a total sales price
of $140,000.00.

(R. 180)

10. The subject property had a fair market value on
the date of January 3, 1985, of $160,000.00.

(R. 181, 140)

11. On July 12, 1985, Commerce filed a Complaint in the
Third District Court against Mahmood (R. 3) wherein Commerce
alleged many of the above facts, including the note between
the parties valued at the time of renewal at $48,968.02, plus
interest and attorney's fees leaving a balance due and claimed
of $57,398.35;
conducted;

that the above said trustee's sale had been

and that the above said amount had been bid.

(R. 4)

By virtue of these facts Commerce claimed a deficiency under the
note with Mahmood of $57,39 8.3 5 and demanded judgment for said
amount. (R. 4)
12. In Mahmood's Answer to the Complaint he raised the
affirmative defense that the actual value of the property far
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exceeded the amount bid at the sale, that by virtue of the
plaintiff having purchased the property it had been compensated
in full, and that no deficiency should be allowed given the
great disparity between true value and the amount bid. (R. 10)
13. Subsequently, in connection with Commerce's Motion
for Summary Judgment, and in Mahmood's trial memorandum (R. 39-41
and R. 96-98 respectively) Mahmood raised the defense that prior
to the trustee's sale conducted on January 3, 19 85, he had
entered into negotiations to refinance the property in question
and discharge both the first and second trust deeds.

He claimed

that in the course of these negotiations Commerce represented to
Mahmood that Commerce would acquire the first note and deed of
trust and would, thereafter, combine the total obligations of the
first and second notes and deeds of trust in a single obligation
and allow Mahmood a period of time of approximately three (3)
years to either effect a sale of the property or structure
refinancing which would, in either event, satisfy and retire the
total obligations evidence by the first and second deeds of trust.
14. Mahmood further contended that he was instructed by
Commerce not to appear at the trustee's sale conducted by the
first deed of trust holder for the reason that his interest would
be protected by Commerce. (R. 97)
15. At the trial held on the 14th of February, 19 89,
these and other defenses raised by Mahmood were considered by the
court, as set forth in the court's Memorandum Decision. (R. 138)
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16. In the court's Memorandum Decision (R. 139-140) the
court rejected the contention of appellant that Commerce said it
would purchase the property and negotiate a settlement with him,
but the court apparently did feel that as a matter of equity the
appellant Mahmood was entitled to the value of the property over
and above the purchase price at the trustee's sale. (R. 139-140)
In so doing the court affixed a value upon the property of
$160,000.00. (R. 140)
17. The respondent Commerce then filed a Motion for
Clarification and Request for Oral Argument with the court. (R.
14 8)

In that motion Commerce claimed (1) the judgment amount

was in error in that the figure given by the court was not
introduced into evidence by either party and basically was the
amount due as of the date of the trustee's sale without accrued
interest to the date of trial and did not represent the entire
amount due as of the date of trial;

and (2) that the court should

not apply the fair market value of the property as a credit towards
the amount due.

(R. 142)

An accompanying schedule was

attached. (R. 152)
18. The court agreed that the figure used had been in
error and by order modified the Memorandum Decision. (R. 158).
However, the court failed to address the other issue concerning
giving a credit towards the amount in the value of the property.
(R. 158-159)
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19. Commerce then submitted to the court proposed Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment.

Mahmood filed an

objection to the proposed findings, conclusions and judgment
(R. 164) and a Motion to Amend Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Judgment.

(R. 16 8)

20. As part of Mahmoodfs arguments to the court he
argued that the court had failed to give him proper credit towards
the amount due by him in light of the findindgs that the property
had a value of $160,000.00 and that as a matter of equity he was
entitled to credit for that value.

(R. 164)

He argued furthermore

that by the court making a finding of a credit it had in effect
found that Commerce would be unjustly enriched and a finding to
the contrary was in error.

(R. 164)

21. Without elaboration the court subsequently denied
Mahmood1s motion to amend the findings and judgment. (R. 177, 187.)
22. Mahmood then filed his Notice of Appeal. (R. 189)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS:
(A) WHAT IS THE VALUE OF THE CREDIT DUE MAHMOOD?:
From the court's Memorandum Decision it is apparent that the court
felt that as a matter of equity Mahmood should be given credit
for the value of the property above and beyond a certain figure.
That is why the court made a finding of the value of the property.
It is Mahmoodfs contention that the value of the credit is the
difference between the the payoff figure to Gate City Mortgage and
the value of the property determined by the court, and not the
difference between the value of the property and the sales price
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for which Commerce sold the property.
(B) HOW SHOULD THE CREDIT BE APPLIED?:

The credit should

be applied towards the difference between the Gate City Mortgage
and the balance due by Mahmood on his promissory note.

No

consideration should be given to the sales price for which
Commerce sold the property.
(C) WAS THERE UNJUST ENRICHMENT TO COMMERCE?:

The court

has seemed to indicate that Mahmood is entitled to a credit
towards his balance due Commerce as a matter of equity.

Is such

a finding in conflict with the court's ruling that there has been
no unjust enrichment in favor of Commerce?

We submit that two

such findings are inconsistent and contradictory.

ARGUMENT
POINT I:
THE APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO A CREDIT TOWARDS THE JUDGMENT
AMOUNT DUE THE RESPONDENT AND THE VALUE OF THAT CREDIT
IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE MARKET VALUE OF THE PROPERTY
AND THE AMOUNT PAID BY COMMERCE TO GATE CITY MORTGAGE.
It is undisputed that Mahmood renewed his loan with Commerce
on January 3, 1984 in the principal sum of $48,968.02.

It is

undisputed that at the time the trustee for the first trust deed
holder conducted its trustee's sale Commerce appeared and purchased
the property for $110,395.11 as the highest bidder.

Other arguments

aside, it is undisputed for purposes of this appeal that after
crediting Mahmood ! s account with the excess received from the
trustee f s sale the amount due on his promissory note to Commerce
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was $57,398.35. (R. 180)

It is also undisputed that the property

in question had a fair market value of $160,000.00 as of the
date of the trustee's sale. (R. 140, 181)

It is at this point

that the parties diverge in their opinions as to the application
of these facts.

One of these points is>the value of the credit.

From the court's Memorandum Decision (R. 138) it is not
entirely clear what the court is attempting to do.

At R. 139

the court notes that "defendant, during his testimony, made a
very strong and persuasive argument that defendant [sic: plaintiff]
would negotiate a settlement with him and told him not to appear
at the trustees sale conducted by the first deed of trust holder
and defendant's interest would be protected."

Whether it is

the court's concern about the possibility that such an event may
have transpired (although the court did reject Mahmood's argument),
or whether the court was concerned about Commerce receiving a
windfall at Mahmood's expense, it is apparent that the court
felt it appropriate to fix the value of the property and give the
appellant a credit as a matter of equity. (R. 140, R. 181, paragraphs
16 and 18.)
Where we feel error lies is with the valuation of the
credit at $20,000.00.

There is no basis for such a finding

when one carefully examines the facts.

The point at which we

believe the court becomes confused is where Commerce sold the
subject property to another party for the sum of $140,000.00.

It

is apparently from this figure that the court derives the $20,000.00
figure, i.e., $160,000 less $140,000 equals $20,000.

But what is
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th e point in using the third party sales price of $140,000?

We

submit that there is none.
If one is to make any sense at all out of the purpose in
afixing a value upon the property, regardless of the amount, it
must be to determine the amount to which Commerce has benefited.
By acquiring property valued at $160,000, the value of Commerce's
benefit must be the difference between this figure and the amount
it paid to Gate City Mortgage.

It is immaterial what they may

later sell the property for to a third party.

What is material is

that they have been benefited in an amount equal to the difference
between what they paid for the property and what the value was of
the property received.

The fact that Commerce sold the property

for a figure substantially below the fair market value fixed by
the court should not result in the difference being due by Mahmood.
If Commerce had sold the property for a figure above $160,000
would they feel Mahmood was entitled to receive payment in cash
for the difference?

Of course not.

If the court had valued the

property below the $140,000 sales price would they be willing to
refund the difference to Mahmood?

Certainly not.

Why then should

the sales price of $140,0 00 have any impact upon the amount due
by Mahmood?

We submit that it should not.

Furthermore, we draw the court's attention to the fact that
the court below made its determinations of value and balance due
on the note to Commerce as of the date of the trustee's sale of
January 3, 1985.

It did not use the subsequent sales date of

of the property.

It must therefore be January 3, 19 85 at which

-11-

time the value of property, balances and credits must be affixed.
A subsequent sales price can have no bearing upon the amount due
by Mahmood, nor can it affect the value received by Commerce in
acquiring the property in January of 1985.

In addition, if the

subsequent sales price is to be considered in determining the
balance due by Mahmood then he is entitled to have Commerce show
that the property was sold for its fair market value as that term
is defined by the courts of this state. [See Redevelopment Agency
Salt Lake City v. Barrutia, 526 P2d 47 at 49 (Utah, 1974]

But

even that may be of no value.
It is readily apparent that if the property had been sold
at or closer to the fair market value of the property then under
the respondent's theory of the credit the credit to Mahmood would
have been reduced.

For example, if the property had sold for

$155,000 then one must assume that Commerce would argue that
Mahmood is only entitled to a $5,000 credit.

The more Commerce

gets out of the sale the more it gets out of Mahmood.

This is

clearly contrary to the equitable requirement that a party
mitigage its damages against another party.
Brown, 646 P2d 692 (Utah, 1982);

[See Alexander v.

Utah Farm Production Credit

Assn. v. Cox, 627 P2d 62 (Utah 1981)]

But what result do we

have if Commerce sold the property for less, thus increasing the
difference betv/een their sales price and the value of the property?
Does the credit due Mahmood then increase?

Under such circumstances

there is no incentive for Commerce to sell the property for the
fair market value.
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From the foregoing it is apparent that when one tries
to reconcile the court's effort to affix an equitable amount with
the sales price of $140,000 one only confronts endless paradoxes.
The only solution therefore is to give Mahmood a credit for
the difference between the purchase price at the trustee's sale
and the value of the property determined by the court.

The

constant contradictions one confronts otherwise renders the entire
situation unworkable.

It is apparent that the court was attempting

to provide an equitable solution by allowing Mahmood a credit
for the value between the sales price to the trustee and the value
of the property.

To inject the subsequent sales price into the

equation only muddies the water and renders the court's efforts
at equitable relief futile.

We therefore submit that the correct

credit is the difference between $160,000 and the amount of the
underlying indebtedness of $109,975.88, to-wit: $50,024.12.
POINT II:
HAVING ARGUED FOR A CREDIT AS SET FORTH IN POINT I, THAT
CREDIT SHOULD BE APPLIED AS SET FORTH HEREINBELOW.
An analysis of the respondent's own testimony and
exhibits conclusively establish that the maximum sums to which
Commerce would be entitled are as follows:
(a) $109,975.88 paid to Gate City Mortgage for first Deed
of Trust. (Finding No. 8, R. 180)
(b) Balance due on promissory note to Commerce: $57,398.35.
(Finding No. 9, R. 180)
(c) Accrued interest on Commerce's note to September 12,
1989, by calculations reflected by Judgment: $10,375.65.
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(d) Attorney's fees awarded by court: $3,000.00.
(e) Costs incurred by Commerce: $141.50.
Total sum due Commerce per their calculations and the
Findings and Judgment is $180,891.38.
LESS:
(a) Fair market value of property on date of Trustee's
sale as determined by court:

$160,000.00.

Balance due Commerce as of September 12, 1989, including
all interest, costs and attorney's fees to date: $20,891.38.
Given the above we submit that the amount due Commerce
as of the date of September 12, 1989 is $20,891.38, giving the
appellant due credit for the fair market value of the property
and ignoring the injection into the equation of the confusing
sales price to a third party.
POINT III:
THE COURT'S AWARD OF EQUITABLE RELIEF CONFLICTS WITH ITS
FINDING OF THERE BEING NO UNJUST ENRICHMENT TO COMMERCE
We submit that on the face of matters any finding by the
court that the appellant is entitled to a credit as a matter of
equity conflicts directly with its finding that there has been
no unjust enrichment to Commerce.

If need be, therefore, such

a finding should be stricken and the equitable credit due Mahmood
should be based upon a finding of unjust enrichment to Commerce.
CONCLUSION
We submit that it is quite clear, and undisputed, that the
court below was attempting to award Mahmood a credit for the
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excess value received by Commerce.
over and above what figure.

The issue is an excess

By our arguments above attempting

to use the $140,000 figure results in all kinds of contradictions
and does not render a logical conclusion and result.

The only

logical method of dealing with the credit is to give Mahmood a
credit for the difference between the fair market value affixed
by the court and the purchase price paid to the first trust deed
holder.

It is clear that by doing so Commerce is made whole, which

we submit was the intent of the court by attempting to award a
credit.

To inject into the formula a subsequent sales figure,

which postdated the values for the property and the purchase price,
only causes confusion and the creation of a plethora of
paradoxical justifications for such a theory.

We therefore

request that the court award a credit as computed in Point II
hereinabove.
DATED this

day of

, 1990.

BRANT H. WALL
WALL & WALL
Attorneys for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify that 4 ttue and correct copies of the
Appellant's Brief on Appeal were mailed, postage prepaid, to
Don E. Olsen, attorney for respondent, 648 E. 100 South, Salt
Lake City, Utah, 84102, on the
day of
, 1990.

GREGORY B. WALL

ADDENDUM

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

COMMERCE FINANCIAL,

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff,

:

CIVIL NO.

vs.

C-85-4542

:

BADI MAHMOOD,

:

Defendant.

:

This matter came on regularly for trial on the 14th day of
February, 1989.
its

counsel

Don

The plaintiff being present and represented by
E.

Olsen

and

defendant

represented by his counsel Brant H. Wall.

being

present

and

Sworn testimony was

taken, evidence introduced, closing arguments made and the matter
submitted.

The Court took the case under advisement.

now

fully

being

advised,

makes

and

enters

its

The Court
Memorandum

Decision.
The Court finds that plaintiff's purchase of the property at
the first trust deed foreclosure sale did not effect a merger of
title

extinguishing

defendant's

obligations,

nor

did

it

constitute payment in full of defendant's obligation, nor did it
constitute a redemption for the use and benefit of defendant.
The Court further finds plaintiff's claim is not barred by
failure to comply with the provisions of the Utah Code relating

COMM. FINAN. V. MAHMOOD
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

to trust deed foreclosure, and further, defendant is not entitled
to relief and punitive damages.
The two issues which presented the Court with difficulty
were:

(1) Did plaintiff represent to defendant it would acquire

the first note and deed of trust; combine the first and second
notes and deeds of trust into a single debt and secure the same
with a single deed of trust on the subject property; and allow
defendant up to three years for repayment at 10% interest?

(2)

What was the actual cash value of the property at 3449 East Loren
Von Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah on January 3, 1985 and around the
first of the year of 1986, when the property was sold to Craig
Smith?
The Court does not consider other defenses of any merit and
therefore dismisses them without further discussion.
Defendant, during his testimony, made a very strong and
persuasive argument that defendant would negotiate a settlement
with

him

and

told

him

not to

appear

at

the trustees sale

conducted by the first deed of trust holder and defendant's
interest would be protected.

However, after weighing all of the

testimony and evidence, the Court is of the opinion and so finds
the evidence does not support defendant's contention.
In regards to the cash value of the property at 3449 East
Loren Von Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, on January 3, 1985 and
around the first of the year of 1986, when the property was sold

COMM. FINAN. V, MAHMOOD
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

to Craig Smith, it is the opinion of the Court and the Court so
finds the value of the property was in excess of $140,000.00, but
did not exceed $180,000.00.

Based on the testimony and evidence

introduced, the Court finds the value of the property to be
$160,000.00.
The plaintiff is awarded Judgment in the sum of $57,398.35
minus

$20,000.00, or

$37,398.35, plus

interest

attorney's fees in the sum of $3,000.00, plus costs.
Dated this

__day of February, 1989.

5
RAYMOND S. UNO
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

at

18%, and

DON E. OLSEN #2460
MATHESON, MORTENSEN & OLSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
648 East First South
Salt. Lake City, Utah
84102
Telephone:
(801)
363-2244
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

COMMERCE

FINANCIAL,
Plaintiff,

)

ORDER MODIFYING
MEMORANDUM DECISION

)

Civil No.

vs .
BADI

M.

MAHMOOD,
C85-4542

Defendant.
Judge Raymond

S.

Uno

Plaintiff's Motion for Clarification of the Court's
Memorandum Decision having come on regularly for hearing on
Monday, Juno

12. 1989 at the hour of 11:45 a.m.;

Plaintiff

appearing by counsel Don E. Olsen and Defendant appearing in
person and by counsel Brant H. Wall; the Court having heard the
arguments and statements of counsel for the respective parties,
plaintiff liaving submitted a schedule of computations as to the
amount of the judgment, Defendant having requested leave to
submit his own Schedule of Computations and said leave having
been granted and Defendant having submitted his Schedule of
Computations and the Court having taken the matter under
advisement and now having reviewed the file, the pleadings and
evidence and having reviewed and considered the arguments of
counsel and the- respective Schedules of Computation and being
fully advised in the promises; it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiff's Schedule of
Computations as to the amount of its judgment is correct and that
plaintiff is entitled to interest at the rate of 18% per annum
from the date of the Gate City foreclosure sale on January 3,
1985 until date of judgment herein on the unpaid
balance due, to-wit:

$37,398.35.

principal

It is further

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Memorandum Decision
dated February 24, 1989, previously entered herein be and the
same is hereby modified in accordance with this order.

It is

further
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiff's

counsel

piepare Findings or Fact, Conclusions of Law and a judgment
accordingly.
DATED this

day of August, 1989.

BY THE COURT:

Raymond S. Uno
District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
n the 1/sC day of / ^ A ^ < ^ Q
, 1989, I mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Order Modifying Memorandum
Decision, postage pre-paid, to:
Brant H. Wall, Esq.
WALL & WALL
Boston Building
#9 Exchange Place, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111

DON E. OLSEN #2460
MATHESON, MORTENSEN & OLSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
648 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 363-2244
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
COMMERCE FINANCIAL,
Plaintiff,

I FINDINGS OF FACT AND
} CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
BADI M. MAHMOOD,
I Civil No. C85-4542
Defendant.
> Judge Raymond S. Uno
The above-captioned matter came on regularly for trial on
Tuesday and Wednesday, February 14 and 15, 1989, the Honorable
Raymond S. Uno presiding; plaintiff appeared by its officer John
R. Woods, Jr. and by counsel Don B. Olsen and defendant Badi M.
Mahmood appeared in person and by counsel Brant H. Wall; both
sides having called witnesses and presented evidence and
testimony and both sides having rested their respective cases,
the matter having been argued by counsel and the Court having
heard and considered the evidence and the arguments of counsel
and having reviewed the file and having taken the matter under
advisement and having heretofore made and entered its Memorandum
Decision and plaintiff having moved for clarification of said
Memorandum Decision and the Court having made and entered its
Order Modifying said Memorandum Decision and now being fully
advised in the premises, makes the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff is a Utah corporation having its principal

place of business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and
defendant at the time of commencement of this action was a
resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
2.

On or about April 5, 1983, Defendant entered into a loan

transaction with plaintiff whereby plaintiff provided to
defendant the principal sum of $48,662,56.
3.

As a part of the loan transaction, defendant executed

certain documents in favor of the plaintiff including a Deed of
Trust.

The Deed of Trust was recorded in the Salt Lake County

Recorder's Office on May 13, 1983 as Entry No. 3793018, in Book
5459, at Page 105, which Deed of Trust related to real property
located at 3449 East Loren Von Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, and
is more particularly described as follows:
All of Lot 823, Mount Olympus Hills, No. 8 Subdivision,
according to the official plat thereof, on file and of
record in the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office.
which Deed of Trust conveyed to plaintiff a second position in
and to said property.
4.

On or about January 3, 1984, the loan was renewed and

plaintiff provided to defendant the principal sum of $48,968.02.
5.

Subsequent to the execution of the loan documents, the

defendant defaulted in making the payments due and owing to
plaintiff on the Note.
6.

On September 7, 1984, a notice of default containing an

election to sell was recorded by Valley Title Company as trustee
under a certain trust deed on the subject property recorded in

the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office on March 31, 1981 as Entry
No. 3543503, in Book 5224, at Page 710, and subsequently assigned
to Gate City Federal Savings and Loan Association.

Gate City

Federal Savings and Loan Association was the first lienholder on
the subject property by virtue of said trust deed.
7.

A trustee's sale of the property was conducted on

January 3, 1985, by Valley Title Company, at which time plaintiff
appeared and purchased the property and acquired title thereto
for the sum of $110,395.11 as the high bidder at the sale, which
sum was paid to Valley Title Company, for the use and benefit of
Gate City Federal Savings and Loan Association.
8.

After satisfaction of the underlying indebtedness of

$109,975.88 secured by the Gate City trust deed, there remained a
balance of $419.23 which was applied to reduce the balance
remaining unpaid on defendant's promissory note.
9.

There was due and owing to plaintiff on the date of said

trustee's sale, January 3, 1985, on defendant's promissory note,
the sum of $57,398.35 together with accruing interest at the rate
of 18% per annum before and after judgment.
10.

On or about March 8, 1985, plaintiff sold the subject

property to Jay Craig Smith and Nancy Smith for the total sale
price of $140,000.00.
11.

Plaintiff's purchase of the property at the Gate City

foreclosure sale of its first trust deed did not effect a merger
of title extinguishing defendant's obligation to plaintiff on his
promissory note.

12.

Plaintiff's purchase of the property at the Gate City

foreclosure sale did not constitute payment in full of
defendant's obligation on his promissory note.
13.

Plaintiff's purchase of the property at the Gate City

foreclosure sale did not constitute a redemption for the use and
benefit of plaintiff.
14.

Plaiintiff has in its handling of defendant's obligation,

complied with all applicable Utah statutes relating to the
foreclosure of trust deeds.
15.

Plaintiff did not represent to defendant that it would

acquire the property, combine the first and second trust deed
obligations and allow defendant additional time for repayment at
a lower rate of interest.
16.

The actual cash value of the subject property on January

3, 1985, the date of the Gate City foreclosure sale was the sum
of $160,000,00.
17.

Defendant's purchase of the subject property at the Gate

City foreclosure sale and subsequent resale to the Smiths did not
constitute an unjust enrichment of plaintiff.
18.

As a matter of equity, Defendant is entitled to a credit

of $20,000.00 toward the balance due on the date of purchase, towit:

$57,398.35 which represents the difference between the

actual cash value of said property on that date and the value
attributed to the property by plaintiff for which the subject
property was actually eventually sold, to-wit:
19.

$140,000.00.

Plaintiff is therefore entitled to judgment against the

defendant in the sum of $37,398.35 together with accrued interest

from and after January 3, 1985 until date of trial at the rate of
18% per annum in the sum of $27,682.97 and accrued interest at
the rate of 18% per annum from date of trial until date hereof in
the sum of $3,633.27.
20.

Defendant agreed as a provision of the notes and trust

deeds executed by him, to pay all reasonable attorney's fees and
costs of collection in the event of default and plaintiff's
reasonable attorney's fees amounted to the sum of $3,000.
21.

Plaintiff is entitled to its costs of court in the sum of

$141.50.
22.

Plaintiff is entitled to interest on the total of its

judgment at the agreed rate of 18% per annum from date of entry
until paid.
23.

Plaintiff's action was brought timely within the terms of

applicable Utah statute.
24.

Plaintiff's conduct did not breach any fiduciary duty

owed to defendant nor has plaintiff been unjustly enriched at
defendant's expense.
25.

Defendant introduced no evidence that plaintiff conspired

with Gate City Mortgage to deprive defendant of his property or
otherwise.
26.

Plaintiff was not required to conduct a meaningless

foreclosure of its second trust deed after the Gate City
foreclosure of the first trust deed and sale of the property to
plaintiff, because such first trust deed foreclosure effectively
foreclosed plaintiff's second trust deed.

27.

No conduct on the part of plaintiff was wanton, willful,

deliberate nor did it inflict any mental pain or distress upon
defendant.
28.

Defendant has not established any of his affirmative

defenses by a preponderance of the evidence.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Defendant has not established any of his affirmative

defenses by a preponderance of the evidence and plaintiff is
entitled to a judgment of dismissal of the same.
2.

Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against defendant in

the sum of $37,398.35 together with interest accrued from and
after January 3, 1985 at the rate of 18% per annum.

3.

Plaintiff is entitled to judgment for its reasonable attorney's
fees in the sum of $3,000.00 and its costs of Court in the sum of
$141.50.
4.

Plaintiff is entitled to interest on the total of its

judgment at the rate of 18% per annum from date of entry until
paid.
DATED this

day of September, 1989.
BY THE COURT:

Raymond S. Uno, District Judge

